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Somatic Encounters: Affect, Presence and Value in Aesthetic Practice 
In one of the stories from Gail Jones's The House of Breathing, there is a meta-fictional 
moment in which the narrator refers to the text as "fact-seeking prose".! In Jones' 
narratives "facts" are related to particular experiences and affective dimensions of 
existence that often pass unrecorded or are effaced by a language too solidified in 
customary meanings to contain them. Creative utterances and the aesthesis they engender 
realize "knowing" that is fully present and has a particularity and value that distinguishes 
it from the knowledge of established discourse. 
In aesthetic experiences words and images strike the body like real objects triggering a 
production of knowing that is fully present and has a specificity and value that 
distinguishes it from customary signs. The crucial elements in what I term "embodied 
knowledge" - affect, emotion and feeling - are conjointly implicated in somatic processes 
and conscious thought. By applying a radical material perspective informed principally 
by the work of Antonio Damasio, Julia Kristeva, Vicki Kirby and Gilles Deleuze to a 
consideration of Jones' work, I hope to demonstrate that creative textual practice is 
predicated on somatic encounters that involve bodily drives and affect in the production 
ofthe "amorous code" or "passional discourse" of art. In such practices, language may 
I Gail Jones, The House of Breathing, 5 (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre 
Press, 1992). 
1 
be viewed as the very stuff of the body, which gives rise to value through sensation. The 
emergent valencies of creative textual practice underpin what Kristeva2 has termed the 
"revolutionary" dimension of poetic language. 
Vicki Kirby3 has observed that an understanding of the sign as something separable from 
the non-linguistic reality of matter leads to closure by confining knowledge to systems of 
representation. She poses the question of what writing can be when it is more than a 
system of signs. Whilst the main focus of this paper is that of writing or textual practices, 
it should be noted that the arguments presented here can be applied to visual and 
performing arts and other aesthetic practices all of generate codes derived from the body. 
As an example of the complex material interchange between the sign and the body, Kirby 
refers to Charcot's work on psychological disorders and his demonstration of 
phenomenon of dermagraphism, the capacity of the skin to produce dermal inscriptions.4 
Kirby extends this idea with reference to Denida's assertion that the most elementary 
processes within living cells is also a "writing" whose system is never closed.5 The 
writing of the body may be viewed as a source of difference, of hitherto unsymbolized 
meaning. Through these generative processes, the body attributes value that belongs to 
situated material reality and sensation feeling and affect operate as less linguistically 
differentiated phases of "knowing". 
2 Julia Kristeva. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and 
Art, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine and Leon S. Roudiez, ed. Leon S. 
Roudiez, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). 
Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984). 
3 Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of The Corporeal, 56 (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 
4 ibid, Kirby, 60 
5 ibid Kirby, 61 
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Kirby points out that the body has tended to be excluded from explanations of meaning-
making for fear that its immutable immediacy leaves no space for change, 'no chance to 
be otherwise". 6 The suspicion of biological accounts as an essentializing approach to an 
understanding of the subject is based on notions of the body as lack or absence; the body 
in such accounts, is mute - is an abyss. However, bodily processes may be understood as 
an absence of the logic of words but not of the alternative logic of sensation or feeling. 
'Knowing' is not only constituted through language, but also through sense and feeling. 
Affect opens up a new paradigm for understanding our relation to the world of objects 
and to each other. It is a paradigm not based on repression and antagonism, but on 
interactive co-emergence, affinity and empathy. Kirby proposes that a holographic 
model provides an explanation of the relationship between body, feelings and mind: 
'Signification and reality are not so much laminated together as two conjoined realms, as 
they are holographically emergent within their implication'.7 
The Body and Affect 
Damasio's account of the relationship between biological processes, emotion feeling and 
conscious or discursive knowledge is also useful here.8 Although culture and learning 
may shape the emergence and expression of emotions, Damasio suggests that they 
constitute an embodiment of the logic of survival. Emotions are dependent on brain 
devices laid down through the evolutionary process and emerge from homeostatic 
processes that regulate and maintain the efficient functioning of living organisms. Far 
from being biologically reductive, Damasios's explanation demonstrates how such 
6 Kirby, Telling Flesh, 61 
7 ibid, Kirby, 66 
8 Antonio R. Damasio,. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in 
The Making of Consciousness, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1999). 
processes are inchoate precursors of conscious thought and language. Dispositional 
alTangements for the regulation of internal states and that maintain the organisms 
boundary and living processes - what Damasio refers s to as core consciousness - are 
biological antecedents of a sense of self.9 Emotions are complicated collections of 
chemical and neural responses, which can be triggered by transient changes in the 
internal and external milieu. Internal states which occur naturally along a continuum of 
pain and pleasure become the 'unwitting non-verbal signifiers of goodness or badness 
relative to the organism's inherent values,.10 Sensory patterns that constitute emotions 
can be induced non-consciously, but may nevertheless result in particular affects and 
response. Damasio notes that emotions are collections of non-verbal responses, which 
can be outwardly observed, whereas, feeling is a private mental experience which is 
poised at the threshold between being and knowing. You can't observe a feeling in 
someone else, but you can observe it in yourself. 11 
What is often understood as the intuitive or non-verbal dimension of aesthetic experience 
and practice may be more readily understood through Damasio's elaboration of emotion. 
Emotions form the substrate for bodily representations, neural patterns and images, which 
may evolve as feeling and subsequently, as conscious thought. Indeed, emotions together 
with other processes of core consciousness may be understood as non-Ianguaged maps of 
related events that follow the logic of narrative. 12 It can thus be argued, that sensation 
and affect are not separate from thought, but are alternatively differentiated aspects of 
thought. 'Consciousness begins when brains acquire the power, the simple power, I must 
add, of telling a story without words. 13 
9 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 136 
10 ibid, Damasio, 30 
11 ibid, Damasio, 42 
12 ibid, Damasio, 184 
13 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 30. 
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Hence we may argue that affect is 'knowing' differently coded. Creative practice or 
allows us to access such codes and to make visible knowledge that custom my uses of 
language and discourse hide. Kirby acknowledges that affects can be "scriptured" into 
the body - the body is socially mediated or inscribed with normative affects. In order to 
understand the generative capacity of the body and emotion, there is a need to distinguish 
between the immediate spontaneous operation of affects and expressions of affect that are 
socially imposed. I suggest that 'art', as embodied practice exemplifies the inducement 
of spontaneous emotions. Aesthetic experience is a source of what may be termed 
"disaffection", a means of ascribing value and meaning that relates to lived experience 
and presence. This dimension of affect permits us to consider aesthetic experiences as 
processes that are not fully contained in culture and reason, but upon which culture and 
reason are ultimately predicated. 
In his theorisation of corporeal narratology, Daniel Punday endorses the notion that that 
bodily processes proceed according to the logic of narrative and that the body and 
emotion are not opposed to reason. He quotes George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenges to western thought, (1980): 
Reason is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the 
nature of our brains, bodies and bodily experience. This is not just the innocuous 
and obvious claim that wee need a body to reason; rather, it is the striking claim 
that the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our 
embodiment. 14 
14 Daniel Punday, Narrative Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Narratology, 1 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
Sylvan Tomkin's theory of subjectivity extends our understanding of the intermeshing of 
drives, affect and cognition. 15 The primary affect is that of interest and excitement which 
is the mechanism of orientation that determines and directs behavior. Orientation is 
intrinsic to living; it is the body's response to objects as stimuli. Orientation may also be 
understood through what Gilles Deleuze elaborates as intention and "intensities". 
Intensities are described as pre-individual, impersonal singularities or intense 
multiplicity, or alternatively, as an undifferentiated state of sensory experience. Deleuze's 
draw a connection between language and sensory experience in his suggestion that the 
sign can be viewed as the movement by which "intensity aims itself in aiming at the 
other".16 He describes discourse as the fluctuation of intensity; - the body is language 
because I' is flexion, a 'double transgression oflanguage by the flesh and of the flesh by 
language". (De leuze 1990:289). Language is the repetition of the body that produces 'the 
only "same" of that which differs,.!7 Through Deleuze, the performance of language 
may be viewed as a modeling of the body. Deleuze suggests that it is only by being tied 
to the body that the mind is incarnated and acquires personality or is affected. IS (Deleuze 
1990:292). Aesthesis or aesthetic experience involves a movement towards the 
fluctuation of intensity and produces a momentaty dissolution or loss of unity of the ego. 
In this state language loses its denotative function in order to discover a value that is 
'purely expressive or emotional' .19 
15 Sylvan Tomkins, Affect Imagery and Consciousness, Volume 1: The Positive 
Affects, 24 (New York; The Springer Publishing Company, 1962). 
16 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, 
Constantin, ed. V. Boundas, 298 (London: The Althone Press, 1990). 
17 Ibid, Deleuze, 289 
18 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 292. 
19 Ibid, Deleuze 298 
Somatic Processes and Language 
Julia Kristeva's elaboration of the somatic or semiotic dimension of language permits a 
fmiher understanding of aesthesis. She articulates the process of kxtual production 
through the notion of Signijiance, the unlimited and unceasing operation of drives 
toward, in and through language.2oSignijlance emerges from the chora, the aliiculation of 
drives, energy charges and psychical marks which constitute a non expressive totality that 
is realized as the semiotic, an asymbolic modality of language that is linked to its 
auditory articulations. The regulatory and reparative function of this process (which is in 
accord with Damasio's account) can be understood through Kristeva's notion of 
'denegation' the staving off of melancholia and the "re-possession" of what was lost 
through the subject's entry into language through language or textual production. 
A considerable body of more recent work demonstrates the complex interrelationship of 
bodily processes affect and language and the implication of this in maintaining optimal 
states or physiological and psychological balance. Drawing on ideas from traditional 
Chinese medicine, Thomas Ots observes that 'Emotions literally express themselves 
through bodily changes, they are utterings of the body.,2l Conversely The metaphors are 
used to describe both emotions and pain refer to bodily states. 
20 Kristeva, 1984, Revolution in Poetic Language, 17. 
21 Thomas Ots, "The Silenced Body - The Expressive Leib: On The Dialectic of 
Mind and Life in Chinese Cathartic Healing" in Embodiment and Experience: 
The Existential Ground of Culture and Self, edited by Thomas J. Csordas, 
116-136 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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Setha M. Low discusses research dealing with people from who have experienced 
psychological distress or "nerves". Sufferers report a set of sensations expressed in 
metaphoric language suggesting loss of body pmis, spatial disorientation such as being 
outside on the surface or below their bodies. Low continues: 
Nervios/nerves suffers shake like a leaf, feel "on pins and needles' ... Often 
The language of the sufferers evoke other bodily metaphors such as those of heat, 
expansion or breakdown, often expressed in hydraulic language... a feeling of 
"bursting out", "breaking out" or "boiling over," an experience therefore of 
crossing the 'natural' boundaries between the inside and OUt.22 
Metaphors are primary ways of making sense of the world and of defining nascent and 
undefined states, allowing us to move from the abstract and inchoate aspect of lived 
experience to a more concrete grasp of what is felt. Cognitive scientists (including 
Johnson and Lakof±) who are involved in investigating the development of thought, 
claim that the metaphor is the em'liest vehicle for ordering bodily sensation and action. 
They suggest that reason is made possible by the body as it experiences the world, and 
grows out of the nature of the organism, 'Thought evolves from embodied experience 
and is creative using metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery based on bodily 
22 Setha, M. Low, "Embodied Metaphors, Nerves as Lived Experience" in 
Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self, 
edited by Thomas J. Csordas, 139-162 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994.). 
experience' .23 
Algirdas Griemas and Jaques Fontanille, in The Semiotics of Passionl4 (outline the way 
in which affect is realized and inscribed as modalities in language. They also suggest that 
the body for whom and in whom semi os is takes place is not separate from language and 
its reality. More specifically, it may be said the body mediates between relations with 
objects as they are felt and relations with objects as they are inscribed in language. Since 
figures of the world can only be given meaning 'through the sensitisation imposed on 
them by the mediation of the body', the 'epistemological subject of theoretical 
construction cannot present itself as a pure rational cognitive subject' .25 Although 
feelings or passions are derived from non-rational codes, they nevertheless produce 
discursive effects and can be realised as syntax. 
The involvement of the body in semiosis originates in desire, which in turn is the source 
of passional states or of the affectivity upon which aesthetic practices and subjectivation 
turn. These include, for example, the practices of literature described by Roland Barthes 
as "the mode of Eros": 
... the affectivity which is at the heart of all literature includes 
an absurdly restricted number of functions: I desire, I suffer, 
I am angry, I contest, I love, I want to be loved, I am afraid 
to die - out of this we must make an infinite Literature.26 
Greimas and Fontanille begin with the assertion that desire constitutes the minimal state 
23 Setha, M. Low, "Embodied Metaphors", 143 
24 Algirdas Greimas, and Julien Fontanille,The Semiotics of Passions: From 
States of Affairs to States of Feelings, trans. Paul Perron and Frank Collins, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
25 Ibid, Greimas and Fontanille, xxi 
26 Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard, xxi (Evanston: North Western 
University Press, 1972). 
q 
of the subject, an undifferentiated state of feeling or protensivity composes of sensory 
excitations that emerge as response to the world of objects (Greimas and Fontanille 
1993). This state of the not-yet-a subject can be construed as a "subject" striving for 
something, which may be understood in terms of the universal attraction of living 
systems towards entropy or alternatively, as relations of attractions and repulsions to 
objects. To understand subjects as being, or meaning, they must be defined by the values 
they acquire, hence Greimas and Fontanille contend that a semiotics of passions may be 
equated to a semiotics of values acquired, lost or suspended by the subject in relation to 
the object of value. Protensivity is a precondition of signification since the subject can be 
affected modally only by the investment of the object which imposes itself into the 
subject as value. 'Features, figures and objects ofthe natural world whose "signifier" 
they constitute, are transformed through perception, into features, figures and objects of 
the "signified" of language' .27 
Orientation and value underscored by raw sensation create an effect of intent that makes 
syntax or the directional flow of language conceivable. Since the body is both part of the 
world as well as the subject, both action on the world and a perceiving or sensing 
organism, the sign that emerges through the subject's engagement with discourse is never 
totally disembodied. From this perspective, the subject can be said to have a unique 
historicity (which is non-teleological- since it is in continuous process), based on its pre-
verbal relation to objects. 
Though Greimas and Fontanille are primarily concerned with the modal or orienting 
configurations of passions, their model does not neglect the realisation of feelings at the 
lexical level. The first articulations of feeling do not in themselves produce semantic 
value. What is produced is a valency of the object, which remains inchoate until the 
27 Greimas and Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, xxi 
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discontinuous sequences of protensivity and its relation to the object are transformed into 
semionarrative organizations - that is into language. This explanation of the relationship 
between language and feeling allows us to conceive of a "passional subject'. 
The forces of attraction and repulsion that produce value also modalise the subject so that 
it may be conceived both in terms of a state of being and a state of becoming. As 
modalities of language or thought, these states can be understood firstly in terms of 
modal functions. 'Having-to' - a punctual function; 'Being-able-to' - a cursive function 
as well as in terms of 'knowing' as closure, and 'wanting-to' as opening. 'Having versus 
knowing' emerge as stabilising functions, whilst 'being-able versus wanting' emerge as 
mobilising functions: 
... passion appears to be constituted syntactically as a 
series of activities: manipulations, seductions, tortures, 
investigations, construction of scenarios and so on ... 
passional syntax takes the form of narrative programs ... 28 
The model provides a key to understanding passion or affect as both a discursive 
cognitive programming and as an emanation of discourse whose code remains unreadable 
even though its effects are made accessible. Affect or passional states produce aesthesis 
(dissociation and dissolving of the subject). In these instances it can be claimed that the 
subject confronts language as a "natural" object that is without value. Aesthesis or the 
dissolution of the subject presents two possibilities: if nothing opposes the dispersive 
forces, chaos settles in. Alternatively, processes will be triggered to produce new 
categorisations realised as creative production. 
28 Greimas and Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, 23. 
11 
Gail Jones: An Exacting Art 
Jones aims for an exactingness of language that can circumvents stereotypic forms, 
which reduce passional existence, and in particular grief, to the banal. In her narrations 
there is a constant tension between the affirmation of the body as a locus of action and 
memory and a recognition of its perishability. She is concerned with the question of 
narrative as a possible means of mediating loss and at the same time of reasseliing the 
exquisiteness of affect: 
I'm interested in the substituting power of words and the 
idea that the materiality of words vouchsafes something for 
us, provisional as it may be.29 
Many of the stories negotiate a space between the limits of the body and the limits of 
language reflecting Damasio's idea that reality and experience is constituted by an 
interplay between the two. In Jones' storytelling memory is posited as a cohering 
element. Subjectivity is realized in her narrative as a composite effect of the body's 
interaction with the physical environment and its construction through social mirroring 
produced in language and other modes of representation. 
In narrative and other aesthetic practices, emotion released into consciousness is not 
dissipated at the point of catharsis but is encoded as an image in language. This 
constitutes a partial salvaging or recuperation of subjective experience that would 
otherwise be lost. It is what confers "originality" or the emergence of signs which are not 
arbitrary, but have a direct relationship to the experiential context. In this sense ali can 
29 Gail Jones, interview, (Perth: Western Australia, 19 April, 1995). 
1 ) 
be said to assuage the grief of loss. Jones' practice illustrates that, just as the body 
mediates language, so words mediate against the chaotic discontinuity of bodily 
existence. 'Grief is a kind of work. You have to do it somewhere'. 30. In Jones' practice 
the work of grief involves a reharnessing of the capacity of language to articulate 
pmiicular and situated truths contingent on experience. 
We have been told by Kristeva31 that words create a presence that permits the effect of 
denegation, restoration and balance, but without affirmation, the presence created 
remains unaffirmed, desire remains unrequited closure and harmony m'e not effected. 
In one of Jones' stories, the word "ruby" exemplifies this. Janet Allotson, the woman, 
recalls Janet Allotson, the child, who experiences a somatic encounter, passional moment 
at the sight of her mother, paintbrush in hand, bent over the kitchen table and preoccupied 
with the labour of constructing a scene in water colour: 
The mother wore on that day a scarlet dress and had 
also rouged cheeks, a cosmetic indulgence usually reserved 
for special occasions. 
As Janet takes in the flourish of her mother's movements and the colours and figures that 
make up the painting on the table, she unexpectedly utters a single word "ruby": 
The word ruby was indubitable, but after that came an interval 
of momentary amnesia, a flat-shaped nothing, a no-mother with 
a no-smile... It was a 'ruby' unrequited. 
My reading suggests that the emotional valency of the word ruby was derived from that 
30 ibid Jones. 
31 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language. 
1 ~ 
sensory moment when objects are given direct value in relation to feeling. In this moment 
of aesthesis, daughter, word and mother become inseparable. However, at the point of 
utterance, the word emerges as a solitary item that fails to be given any further 
contextualisation either as part of the child's own capacity for nanative organisation or 
from an interchange between mother and child that might have affirmed the world in 
relation to the lived moment and so allow it to be carried forward into future exchanges 
between the two. In such a hypothetical scenario "ruby" may then have come to realise a 
specific emotion forged between mother and child, a particular aesthetic effect of the 
painting, one related to the way in which the mother has dressed and made up her face 
with rouge or perhaps a restorative closure It is a demonstration of how metonymy 
facilitates passional connections. Before long, the word (in this speculative fabrication) 
might have undergone various processes of catachresis which might have separated it 
from the initial experience to which it was related; it would nevertheless have existed as a 
bearer of silent memories and bodies. In this story, however, the works fails to be given 
any place in discourse and remains as an undifferentiated marker of a specific emotional 
state despite the child's second attempt to reconstruct it within a social relation: 
If there was any vision now attached it was indistinct, 
uncertain ... there was some inkling of another existence 
both absolutely fantastic - lodged in phonology and 
imagination ... there seemed in that moment an urgent 
need for reclamation. 32 
Gilles Deleuze refers to the notion of "pure language' as the provocation of the mind by 
the body.33 In Deleuzian terms, the child's utterance can be said to derive from an 
absence of the customary rules of language system. This is the effect of aesthesis, the 
32 Gail Jones, The House of Breathing, 73 
33 Deleuze The Logic of Sense, 291 
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dissolution of self through affect. In this state sense appears, but memory of the word as 
a denotation disappears: Jones' continues, 'It was a moment in which she felt ... an 
appalling sensation of the disconnectedness of things' . 
To the mother the word the word remains in the world of impure language or everyday 
dennotative use, a state where the word is heard or recalled, but where the sense or 
embodied significance remains obscure. The word "ruby", it could be argued, was lost to 
Janet Allotson firstly because it could not be accommodated by the logic of the socio-
symbolic law, and, secondly, because Janet was unable to find a performative space that 
might have permitted it to enter the symbolic via praxis. What is notable, however, is 
that the word, though repressed, was not obliterated, but surfaced as an effect of a 
subsequent passional state in her adult life: 
Then without exactly knowing why, though hoping to arouse, 
hoping to inspire a sleepily amorous response ... she bent over 
her lover's ear and whispered very seductively the single word 
'ruby,.34 
The story "Touching Tiananmen Square" explores the role played by consensus in the 
construction of social knowledge and reality. It is also demonstrates the way in which a 
particular engagement with words dissolves the separation of past and present, self and 
other. In this narrative de Celieau's 35 notion of walking as a subversive act is realised in 
34 Jones, The House of Breathing, 76 
35 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1988). 
1 " 
the construction ofthe solitary walker. Roaming the square, the man in Beijing seeks 
some affirmation of his knowledge of the place, which exists as a memory for which any 
sign of external collaboration has been utterly obliterated. It is only one year after the 
student massacre that occurred in that place, but now the square is festive. There are 
stalls, children flying kites and family groups sucking on ice creams and posing for the 
gratuitous but highly desired family photograph. Anna the tourist has felt a strange 
compulsion to remain in Beijing longer than she had intended. She too walks the streets 
and soon becomes aware of a particular young man who follows and watches her. 
Finally (after six or seven days) the man approaches Anna and, after establishing her 
country of origin: 
... he seized both her hands and with a kind of mad man's 
intensity mumbled some sort of enigmatic slogan' Y oon 
faw, Y oon faw' .36 
It is not until much later that Anna comprehends the meaning ofthe man's utterance. He 
was refening to June Four the date commemorating the violent events of Tiananmen 
Square, events which Anna herself had striven to repress as she holidayed in Beijing. At 
his moment, the words "Y oon faw" trigger the affect, which materialises or repeats the 
events of the past with a crushing sense of presence. 
The physical contact between Anna and the young man reminds us that the body is 
associated with knowledge that is often masked by the everyday transactions of language 
and other semiological regimes. Such, knowledge, however, may be given voice in 
aesthetic discourse, which dissolves the distance and separation of discrete bodies. 
36 Gail Jones, The House of Breathing, 138 
lfl 
Jones' fictive character, Alfonso's reconstruction of a series of childhood memories focus 
on his attachment to, and unresolved loss of his grandmother, Nina. This culminates in 
the moment when he recalls a single word despite the blocking of his memory of her with 
schoolboy tales of 'bravado fantasies about ghosts and wal1'iors ... headless saints, 
demented mistresses spider-limbed heroes ... ,37 On this occasion, the word "Ardentia" 
resurfaced to his consciousness. It was a word that his grandmother had used when 
describing to him a 'particular strange phosphorescence on the bodies of fish that 
fishelmen learn to see on moonless nights,38 At that moment recalls Alfonso, 'I suddenly 
wept, since it replaced me on the spot, in her arms, beneath the mantilla. ,39 Like the 
word "ruby" of the earlier story, "Ardentia" is a marker of a hithelio unresolved and 
unrnodalised state of affect. The power of Alfonso's retelling lies in its ability to reinstate 
what in other terms might have remained unsayable or too painful to say. His narration 
also illustrates Jones' observation that: 
The sort of memories that matter to people are often studded with 
certain kinds of words, ... there are words that are 
strange attractors, their density attracts a kind of semiotic 
charge. 40 
Moreover, such words are able to overturn absence imposed by what Deleuze 41 refers to 
as 'impure language' or use oflanguage, which is a revocation of the body. The word 
"Ardentia" in Alfonso's story-telling becomes not only an incarnation of his grandmother 
, but of himself as a repetition of the same which differs, of his body of the past as it is 
37 Gail Jones, The House of Breathing, 40 
38 Ibid, Jones, 40 
39 Ibid, Jones, 41 
40 Gail Jones, The House of Breathing, 6 
41 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 291 
17 
felt in the present. It is a word that has arisen from affect, or the logic of sense, a, 
'provocation of the mind by the body'.42 
In another tale "On The Piteous Death ofMalY Wollstonecraft ", human existence is 
again shown to be precariously balanced between the limits of the body and the limits of 
representation. Mary Wollstonecraft, celebrated in both her own time and in the present 
as feminist and writer of A Vindication a/the Rights a/Women is a person of 'gravity 
and of substance' .43 She can be said to exist as a construction of representation. Famous 
and remote, she is thus removed from the theatre of corporeal existence. By narrativising 
Wollstonecraft's death, Jones paradoxically resurrects her as a woman of flesh and 
passion and, in doing so, momentarily closes the gap between the woman as material 
substance and those representations of her, including her own writings, which construct 
her as mythical figure. Jones' manipulation oflanguage produqes images of suffering 
that are palpable, reconnecting the woman to the lived experience ofthose who identify 
with her. Through the materialisation of Mary's body and of feeling, Jones secures a 
claim for language as an incarnation of the flesh. 
Mary "broken and bloody" after childbirth is no longer mistress of the body whose 
enactments were once the carnal pre-figurations of freedoms the woman proclaimed in 
her writing. In her extremity, however, she must succumb to whatever "medical" 
abasement is prescribed for her by a patriarchal rationality that claims to know what is 
best. Because Mary's newly born infant is still too weak to suck, her milk is to be drawn 
out of her by other means: 
Dr. Fordyce is busy alTanging with veterinary firmness 
a small brown puppy upon each breast.. . Mary is quaking 
42 ibid, Deleuze, 291 
43 ibid, Jones 105 
1 g 
and in a state of revulsion. The animals writhe at her 
chest imposing anguish ... Mary's two swollen breasts ache 
tenibly from bites and scratches inflicted by the puppies. 
Her insides are raw, wounded womanly.44 
The visual and material exactitude of Jones' writing is both the effect and production of 
feeling. Aesthetic experience whether as the production or reception of art involves the 
realisation of affect not as absence or abyss, but as a generative mode of production, a 
code other than that of language which in tum is transfonned and emerges as the 
incarnation of the body as language. 
44 Gail Jones The House of Breathing, 118-119 
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